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Abstract
In an uncertain environment, probabilities are key to predicting future events and making adaptive choices. However, little
is known about how humans learn such probabilities and where and how they are encoded in the brain, especially when
they concern more than two outcomes. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), young adults learned the
probabilities of uncertain stimuli through repetitive sampling. Stimuli represented payoffs and participants had to predict
their occurrence to maximize their earnings. Choices indicated loss and risk aversion but unbiased estimation of
probabilities. BOLD response in medial prefrontal cortex and angular gyri increased linearly with the probability of the
currently observed stimulus, untainted by its value. Connectivity analyses during rest and task revealed that these regions
belonged to the default mode network. The activation of past outcomes in memory is evoked as a possible mechanism to
explain the engagement of the default mode network in probability learning. A BOLD response relating to value was
detected only at decision time, mainly in striatum. It is concluded that activity in inferior parietal and medial prefrontal
cortex reflects the amount of evidence accumulated in favor of competing and uncertain outcomes.
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Introduction
In an uncertain environment, probabilities are crucial informa-
tion because they improve prediction of future events. For
humans, information about the likelihood of events can be
described with abstract symbols, for instance with a verbal
sentence or a pie chart. But in many situations, probabilities are
learned through experience by observing the occurrence of events
[1]. Animals can only learn probabilities through experience as
they have no access to language. Thus understanding how
information about probabilities is acquired in the brain is a
fundamental question in decision neuroscience for both humans
and animals.
In the present study, we focused on the probability of events
independently of their value. The motivation came from the
observation that people can memorize, make predictions, and
decide in the absence of immediate reinforcements. This ability to
build a representation of the environment independently of the
rewards to be received is made explicit in model-based reinforce-
ment learning [2]. In addition, a separate estimation of probability
and value is necessary to ensure rational choices [3,4]. This
principle called ‘‘probabilistic sophistication’’ might seem counter-
intuitive because probabilities are combined with values to
estimate expected value in many decision models (e.g., expected
utility). Nevertheless, the fact that probabilities and values are
multiplied does not contradict the necessity to estimate them
independently. The concept of probabilistic sophistication is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
In psychology, there has been a long tradition of research
showing that people can learn the probabilities of stimuli with no
value like neutral words or symbols [5–7]. In neuroscience, this
type of inference has been studied with categorization tasks [8]. In
the weather prediction task for instance, participants have to
predict the occurrence of two probabilistic outcomes through trial
and error (e.g., sunshine or rain). The probability of the outcome is
conditional on a set of four symbols. When comparing this task to
a control condition, authors have found activation in a large
network including the medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, inferior
parietal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex and striatum [9–11]. A
limitation of these studies is the use of a subtraction instead of a
parametric approach. It is thus unknown if regions in the brain
encode the probability of the outcome in this task.
Following a parametric approach, authors have observed a
larger BOLD response in striatum and ventro medial prefrontal
cortex when the probability of an anticipated reward increased
[12–14]. These results have been interpreted in terms of value
because for a single and uncertain reward, probability and
expected value are positively correlated. Other regions of the
brain, like the parietal cortex and the amygdala, have been found
to increase with the probability of an upcoming punishment
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[15,16]. To support probabilistic sophistication however, one has
to identify structures in the brain which encode probability
independently of value.
The effect of value can be controlled for by relating brain
activity to the probabilities of events and making sure these
probabilities do not covary with reward expectation. An event can
be defined as a stimulus, its omission, a feed-back and so on. In
reinforcement learning studies, authors have shown a larger
BOLD response to the occurrence of rare events [17–19]. Activity
has generally been found in the lateral parietal and prefrontal
cortex. Using EEG, numerous studies have shown an enhanced
brain response (P300) to rare target in the odd ball paradigm
[20,21]. It should be noted that in these fMRI and EEG studies,
brain activity was not always related to the probability of the
outcome, but to other measures like surprise or ‘‘state’’ prediction
error (one minus the estimated probability of the outcome).
However, these measures are highly and negatively correlated with
probability. If the surprise or state prediction error is large, the
outcome probability is low.
The brain response to rare events has been explained by
associative learning theory (as a prediction error) [18,19] or
statistical inference (as a Bayesian surprise) [17,21,22]. In a
learning context however, we are not aware of experiments
showing a positive correlation between brain activity and event
probabilities. This is surprising because several models explain
choices as the result of evidence accumulation [23,24]. When the
environment is stable (probabilities do not change overtime), the
past occurrence of an uncertain stimulus constitutes evidence for
its future occurrence.
In a perceptual decision-making task, the agent has to make a
decision based on a noisy signal. Several studies in monkeys have
shown that the firing rate of neurons in the lateral intraparietal
cortex increased over time as a function of the proportion of dots
moving in the same direction [25,26] and this pattern is well
explained with artificial neural networks [27]. In these studies,
accumulation of evidence is observed by recording the firing rates
of neurons with a specific response field [26,28]. With fMRI, the
researcher only has access to the activation of a large population of
neurons and evidence accumulated by neurons of one response
field (e.g left direction) might cancel out the evidence accumulated
by neurons sensitive to a different response field (e.g. right
direction).
In a probability learning task evidence is not presented
simultaneously but one after another. This offers the opportunity
to relate brain activity to the characteristic of the currently observed
evidence (which serves as a probe). If the evidence has been
observed many times, retrieval models based on accumulation
processes predict a stronger brain response because the probe
matches numerous traces of past outcomes in memory [29,30]. In
neuroscience, it has been proposed that the inferior parietal cortex
plays the role of a mnemonic accumulator because this area is more
activated during the successful recognition of old versus new items
[31–33]. Other regions of the default mode network (medial
temporal lobes, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex)
have been found to be more activated for objects which are easily
associated to a specific context compared to objects eliciting weak
association [34,35]. According to the principle of an accumulation
of evidence in memory, a positive BOLD response can be expected
for likely events, particularly in the default mode network.
Overall, studies have identified regions in the brain where activity
increased with the probability of a single and random reward.
BOLD response related to reward probability has been observed,
mainly in striatum [12,36] and ventro medial prefrontal cortex
[13,37]. However, when the effect of value was controlled for, an
increase of activity in response to unlikely outcomes has been found
in lateral parietal and lateral prefrontal cortex [17–19]. As such,
previous studies on learning have shown that the brain reacts to
rewarding or rare events but not to likely events. This conflicts with
models of perception and memory [27,29] where activity increases
with the accumulation of evidence. In a probability learning task, we
found that activity in bilateral inferior parietal and medial prefrontal
cortex increased for events which had been observed many times
and were likely to occur again.
Results
Rational of the task
We developed a task where evidence for future outcomes were
balls drawn from a bin. The bin contained balls of different colors
and each color was associated to a payoff (Fig. 2a). The
Figure 1. Probabilistic sophistication. A separate estimation of
probability and value is necessary to guarantee rational choices in
decision theory. This separation also offers more flexibility in goal
oriented decisions. Indeed, the subjective values of events change with
our goals but not their probabilities of occurrence which are controlled
by the environment (or the response of the environment to our
actions). For instance, a person is trying to estimate the probability that
it will rain. On the left side of the figure, she wants to water her garden.
Thus ‘‘rain’’ is a positive event relative to her goal. On the right side, she
wants to go for a bike ride. Thus ‘‘rain’’ is a negative event. It can be
seen that the subjective value of ‘‘rain’’ changes with personal goals but
not the chance it will rain. Therefore, it would be adaptive for the brain
to encode the probabilities and values of events separately.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.g001
Author Summary
In order to make adaptive choices, people need to gather
evidence to predict what will happen next. In general, the
more frequently an event is observed, the more likely it
will occur in the future. Thus the probability of an event is
useful to predict its future occurrence. Previous studies
have identified regions in the brain that react to rewarding
or surprising events, but not to likely events. In the present
study, participants had to predict payoffs by observing
their repeated occurrence. Functional imaging showed
that brain activity in inferior parietal and medial prefrontal
cortex increased if the currently observed payoff had been
seen many times before. This suggests that these two
cortical regions accumulate evidence to predict future
events. Further analyses revealed that they belonged to
the larger default mode network. This network is involved
in introspection and remembering. The inferior parietal
and medial prefrontal cortex might thus support the
prediction of future events by activating memories of past
events.
Accumulation of Evidence for Probabilistic Events
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composition of the bin was hidden, therefore payoff probabilities
were unknown to the participants. However, they had the
opportunity to learn these probabilities by observing 10 to 14
drawings from the bin. Balls were sampled one after another with
replacement and shown in the center of the bin. The sample
payoff was displayed but not the color of the ball. Thus colors were
hidden states and payoffs were stimuli (Top insert, Fig. 2b). Colors
could be inferred from payoffs because the color-payoff association
was shown to the participants in the periphery of the bin. After the
10 to 14 draws, this association changed while color probabilities
remained constant. In this resampling phase, 10 to 14 balls were
drawn again.
At the end of the sampling and resampling phases, participants
had to decide to buy or not a gamble for a certain price. After their
choice, the payoff was determined by drawing an additional ball
from the bin. If participants decided to buy, they earned the price
minus the payoff (this net payoff could be negative). If they decided
to pass, the net payoff was 0. To maximize their earning, it was
optimal for them to predict the payoffs (stimuli) based on the colors
(hidden states). Participants learned the probability of 2, 5, or 10
payoffs (Histograms, Fig. 2b).
For the main analysis, brain activity in the sampling stages was
regressed on the probability of the currently observed stimulus,
that is the probability of seeing the evidence. Probabilities of
stimuli were orthogonal to their values and the value to be
expected at the end of the sampling or resampling period. For
instance, if a red ball was associated with a low payoff, sampling a
red ball increased the probability of seeing this low payoff, but it
decreased the expected payoff. The independence between
probability and value was obtained by randomly assigning payoffs
to colors.
Behavioral choice
To decide whether to buy the gamble for a certain price or to
pass it, participants had to predict the gamble payoff at the end of
each sampling stage. Analysis was conducted to determine from
gamble choices whether participants estimated probabilities based
on the color or payoff history (Fig. S1 in Text S1). If inference is
based on colors (hidden states), it can be concluded that people are
able to make abstraction of rewards when estimating the likelihood
of future outcomes. When extracting probabilities from choices,
one needs to control for attitudes towards uncertainty. We did so
in a generally accepted way, using prospect theory, which allows
one to separately control for loss aversion (‘‘losses loom larger than
gains’’) and differential risk attitudes.
When a new bin was introduced, initial beliefs were set to
equiprobable priors, and subsequent updating was assumed to
follow Bayes’ law. The posterior stimulus probability increased
with the accumulation of evidence. At the end of each sampling
stage, probabilities and payoff magnitudes (net of the price) were
combined to compute gamble expected value according to
prospect theory principles. The decision to buy was predicted
from valuation with a logistic regression. We compared models
with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), because it can be
used with non-nested models and limits the risk of over-fit by
penalizing free parameters (a lower BIC is better). Models are
indexed by the number of free parameter (M2, M3, etc.) and are
presented in the Methods section below.
The most efficient model (the best compromise between
parsimony and fitting) was a model with payoff probabilities
calculated conditional on the colors of the balls drawn since the
presentation of a new bin (model M4, BIC= 1250, Table 1).
Colors were hidden states but could be inferred from the
observed payoffs. It was more efficient than a model with payoff
probabilities calculated conditional on the payoffs observed
since the beginning of the sampling or resampling stage (M4a,
BIC= 1271). In this model, participants ignore colors and have
to re-estimate probabilities after the payoff-color association
changed. Further analyses at the individual level showed that
model M4 offered a better fit than M4a for all participants
(section Behavioral choice & Fig. S2 in Text S1). Thus all
participants appeared to be ‘‘sophisticated’’: their inference
was indirect, based on the hidden states behind the observed
payoffs, rather than on the observed payoffs directly. Model M4
was more efficient than a model which did not update payoff
probabilities (M4b, BIC= 1354). In this latter model,
Figure 2. Task design. (a) Payoffs were determined by the colors of balls drawn from a bin. In two sampling stages, participants had the
opportunity to learn probabilities by observing several drawings. Payoffs were shown in the center of the screen (stimuli). Colors were not displayed
(hidden states). After each sampling stage, participants had to decide to buy the gamble or not for a certain price. In the initial sampling stage, both
the composition of the bin and the color-payoff association were new. In the resampling stage, the composition of the bin remained the same (same
color probabilities) but the associated payoffs were new. (b) Top insert. The color-payoff association changed in the resampling stage.
Histograms. These are the true probabilities used to generate the drawings for bins with 2, 5, or 10 colors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.g002
Accumulation of Evidence for Probabilistic Events
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 3 January 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e1002895
participants used equiprobable payoffs to make decisions
(absence of learning).
Model M4 included a prospect theory value function. It was
more efficient than a simpler model using a linear value function
(M2, BIC= 1312). The shape of the estimated non-linear function
revealed diminishing sensitivity for large payoffs (either positive or
negative) and greater importance of losses compared to gains.
Decision parameters found in previous studies are reported in the
footnote of Table 1. Loss aversion was close to the estimation by
Tversky and Kahneman in a study made on decisions from
description [38]. Diminishing sensitivity was more pronounced in
the present study (Fig. 3a).
Model M4 was more efficient than a model that included a
prospect theory probability weighting function (M5, BIC= 1251).
Indeed, the later model led to a quasi-linear function. We also
report the estimation found in decisions from description by
Tversky and Kahneman [38] and in decisions from experience by
Hau et al. [39]. Probability weighting appears to be minimal in
decisions from experience (Fig. 3b).
Finally a reinforcement learning algorithm was estimated (M3).
The first payoff observed at the beginning of the sampling or
resampling period defined the initial forecast. Then each new
payoff was compared to the previous forecast to compute a
prediction error. This prediction error multiplied by a learning
rate was added to the previous forecast to find the new forecast.
This model used a linear value function and bypassed probabilities
in order to directly estimate the expected payoff of the gamble.
Results showed it had the lowest efficiency (BIC= 1428). Thus
probability-based models offered a better explanation of decisions
than a reinforcement algorithm.
In sum, the analysis of choices indicated that participants were
loss and risk averse (non-linear value function), but there was no
indication of a distortion of probabilities (linear probability
weighting function). Supporting the principle of probabilistic
sophistication, participants learned probabilities based on the
hidden states and not simply the observed payoffs. A reinforce-
ment learning model tracking payoffs to estimate gamble values
performed worse than any of the probability-based models.
Brain response to stimulus probabilities
The threshold for significance was set at pv:001, uncorrected,
cluster w100 voxels for voxel-based analyses (including the
identification of ROIs). False Discovery Rates (FDRs) are reported
in tables, to gauge the risk of false-positive results. Coordinates are
given in MNI space [mm]. The threshold was set to pv:05 to
analyze mean activation in ROIs. Circularity in ROI analysis was
avoided with cross-validation. Subject variability was modeled as a
random factor in voxel-based and ROI analyses. Details on the
GLMs (GLM1, GLM2, etc.) are given in the Brain analysis section
of Text S1.
The display of a new payoff in the center of the bin is referred as
a stimulus and gives evidence for future outcomes. Stimuli were
defined as 1 [s] events and led to a significant activation in the
occipital cortex and bilateral hippocampus (GLM1, Table S1 in
Text S1).
Probabilities inferred from the history of the hidden states were
entered as a covariate to modulate the effect of stimuli (model M4).
For instance in Fig. 2a (Resampling), when ‘‘68’’ was displayed the
probability of seeing ‘‘68’’ was used as a parametric covariate.
When ‘‘46’’ was displayed the probability of seeing ‘‘46’’ was used
instead. Thus analyses were conducted with the probability of the
currently observed stimulus. Probabilities estimated with model
M4 ranged from 0.08 to 0.92. The probability of the stimulus did
not correlate with its associated payoff magnitude (r~{:02,
p~:27) or the gamble expected payoff (r~{:01, p~:48). This is
because payoffs were randomly assigned to colors which in turn
were randomly assigned to probabilities. For example, in Fig. 2a
(Resampling), the stimulus ‘‘46’’, which was the lowest payoff in
the bin, could have a low or high probability of occurrence
because it was randomly assigned to the color blue. There is thus
no confound between probability and value in our design.
Results showed a positive and significant effect of stimulus
probabilities medially in the prefrontal cortex and bilaterally in the
angular gyrus (Fig. 4a+b, Table S2 in Text S1). In these regions,
brain activity increased when a stimulus was likely to be observed
(confirmatory signal). A negative and significant effect of
probabilities was also observed in the occipital, superior parietal,
and middle frontal gyrus. Activity in the middle frontal gyrus was
posterior and reached the precentral gyrus (Fig. S3a in Text S1). A
significant effect was also observed in the bilateral hippocampus
(Table S3 in Text S1). In these regions, brain activity increased
when a stimulus – learned to be rare – was observed (surprise
signal). Activation related to stimulus probabilities survived
correction for multiple comparisons, except in the hippocampus
(FWE, a~:05).
When a payoff was displayed in the sampling or resampling
period, it generated a prediction error. This prediction error was
calculated with model M4 as the change in expected value before
Table 1. Choice models.
Probability
Model Value Probability Inference BIC b0 b1 l a c
M2 Linear Linear Hidden states 1312 20.49 0.38 - - -
M4* Non-linear Linear Hidden states 1250 0.95 0.54 2.57 0.69 -
M4a Non-linear Linear Observations 1271 1.00 0.53 2.66 0.68 -
M4b Non-linear Linear No learning 1354 0.51 1.31 1.69 0.44 -
M5 Non-linear Non-linear Hidden states 1251 1.00 0.59 2.55 0.63 0.89
Reinforcement
Model
Value Probability Inference BIC b0 b1 k
M3 Linear Ignored Observations 1428 20.39 0.31 0.17 - -
*Best efficiency; Nbr. data = 1648; b0 = intercept, b1 = slope, l= loss aversion, a=diminishing sensitivity, c=probability weighting, k= learning rate; Tversky et al., 1992:
l= 2.25, a=0.88/0.88 (gain/loss), c= 0.61/0.69; Hau et al., 08: a=0.94/0.86, c= 0.99/0.93.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.t001
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and after the new payoff was revealed. Results indicated that
prediction errors did not increase or decrease the effect of stimuli
on the brain (GLM2, no table or figure was reported for this non-
significant covariate). Thus, the brain encoded stimulus probabil-
ities but not values during the learning phase. We used the sign of
the prediction error to define positive and negative stimuli
(GLM3). Results showed BOLD response to probabilities in the
angular gyri and medial prefrontal cortex for both positive and
negative stimuli (Tables S4 & S5 in Text S1). Thus, the encoding
of probabilities was comparable for positive and negative stimuli.
In short, it appeared that during the learning phase the brain
ignored values (probabilistic sophistication) and focused on
probabilities.
A BOLD response to unlikely stimuli has been reported in the
literature [17,19]. The BOLD response to likely stimuli is novel. We
will focus on this positive correlation in the rest of the results. ROIs
were defined as the cluster of voxel significantly activated for a given
variable of interest (GLM4) and mean activations in ROIs (GLM5)
were further analyzed with mixed effect regressions. ROIs analyses
revealed that BOLD response in angular gyrus and medial
prefrontal cortex was better explained by stimulus probabilities
inferred from the hidden states (model M4) rather than the observed
payoffs (model M4a), in line with the behavioral results. The
interaction of probabilities with ROI location was not significant.
The effect of stimulus probabilities is thus similar in the three ROIs
(Table S6 in Text S1, see [40] for the necessity to test interactions
before making simple contrasts). The number of colors did not
interact with stimulus probabilities, meaning that the effect of
probabilities was not influenced by the number of states (Table S6 in
Text S1). When the effect of probabilities was estimated for each
number of states, it was found to be significant for 2 (pv:001), 5
(p~:003), and 10 states (p~:006, Table S7 in Text S1).
Analysis of choices revealed that expected utility was linear
relative to probabilities. We also tested whether BOLD responses
in the three ROIs increased linearly with probabilities. The first
model included only an intercept and yielded to a BIC of 78707.
In the second model, we added a linear effect for stimulus
probabilities. This linear effect of probabilities was significant
(Table S8 in Text S1) and the BIC fell to 78491, showing an
increase in efficiency. Finally, a non linear weighting function was
added. The linear effect was again significant (pv:001). In
contrast with the inverted-S shape of prospect theory, there was a
slight diminution of sensitivity for probabilities close to 0 and 1
(Fig. 3c) but this non-linear effect was not significant (c~1:49,
p~:22, Table S9 in Text S1). The BIC of this model was 78542,
showing a decrease in efficiency compared to the previous model.
Similar results were found when the non-linear model was tested
on each ROI separately (no table was reported for the separate
Figure 3. Value and probability functions. (a) Value function as estimated from participants’ decisions (red, model M4.) Estimation obtained by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in a study on decisions from description. (b) Probability weighting inferred from choices (red, model M5) and
comparison with estimations from other studies in the gain and loss domains (Gain - Hau et al., 2008 is confounded with the linear function.) (c) Top
insert. To avoid circularity, ROIs for each individual were determined based on the data of all other participants. ROI voxels common to all
participants are shown in yellow. ROI voxels belonging to at least one participant are shown in red. This representation shows to which extent the ROI
definitions vary in the cross-validation. Main. Increase of BOLD response with stimulus probabilities in medial prefrontal cortex and angular gyri
during the learning phase. Data of the 3 ROIs has been merged. The y axis indicates the effect the presentation of new stimulus (payoff) had in the
ROIs. The effect increased with the probability of the currently observed stimulus. The non-linear regression (red) includes a probability weighting
function.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.g003
Figure 4. Learning phase. (a~:001, uncorr.) Volume (a) and
sectional (b) views of the BOLD response to stimulus probabilities in
medial prefrontal cortex and bilateral angular gyrus. Activity increases
with the probability of the currently observed stimulus. (c) Voxels
showing increased connectivity with angular gyri and medial prefrontal
cortex ROIs compared to the resting phase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.g004
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analyses). Thus, we found no evidence for a non-linear encoding of
stimulus probabilities when learned from experience.
Connectivity analysis was conducted to explore the functional
link between the ROIs encoding stimulus probabilities and the rest
of the brain. Each of the ROIs was taken as a seed region in three
separate analyses. Results showed that during the learning phase
(compared to the resting phase) the correlation increased between
each ROI and voxels in the two other ROIs. Correlations also
increased between each ROI and the posterior cingulate (no table
or figure was reported for the separate analyses). Connections with
posterior cingulate cortex were also observed when voxels of the
three ROIs were merged to define a single seed region (Fig. 4c,
GLM6, Table S10 in Text S1).
Brain response to value and uncertainty
Comparing the active phase (when choices were made without
knowing the outcome in advance) to the control phase (when the
outcome was known before making choices), significant activity
was observed in the occipital cortex, suggesting that visual
exploration of the bin was more intense when the outcome was
unknown (GLM1, Table S11 in Text S1). In addition, BOLD
responses in the right anterior insula and bilateral caudate were
significant. These regions have been involved in risky decision-
making, which is present in the active phase but not in the control
phase [41].
During the learning phase, we have reported above how brain
activity changed as a function of probabilities of a specific stimulus.
This approach was possible because stimuli (payoffs) were
presented one at a time. But the approach cannot be used when
the participants deliberated on their choice because all possible
outcomes should be contemplated at once. To study the link
between brain activity and probabilities during the decision epoch,
a measure that summarizes the set of outcome probabilities should
be used instead. Here, we chose entropy, which measures the
uncertainty reflected in a set of probabilities. Entropy increases as
the probability distribution approaches the uniform distribution.
During the deliberation preceding the decision to buy or pass,
the expected gamble value (net of the price) was related to activity
in the caudate and spread to other regions in the brain (Fig. S4a,
Table S12 in Text S1). At the same period, expected value
interacted with outcome entropy in the bilateral insula (Fig. 5a &
Table S13 in Text S1). An ROI analysis revealed a main and
positive effect of expected value in insula. The interaction showed
that this effect of value was stronger when the outcome entropy
was high (Fig. S4b+c & Table S14 in Text S1). Thus, the insula
seems to be especially sensitive to the value of gambles with
uncertain outcomes.
In order to quantify uncertainty regarding choices, we
computed the entropy of the probabilities (and complementary
probabilities) that participants bought into the gamble (as
predicted by model M4). Voxel-based analyses showed a
significant effect of choice entropy in dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (Fig. 5b & Table S15 in Text S1). ROI analyses were
conducted to further test the double dissociation between outcome
and choice entropy in insula and anterior cingulate. Results
indicated that choice entropy was specifically encoded in anterior
cingulate and not insula. The dissociation was not significant for
outcome entropy. Finally, BOLD response in the bilateral striatum
(putamen and caudate) was related to the net payoff revealed at
the end of each decision phase (Fig. 5c & Table S16 in Text S1).
Resting phase
The three ROIs found to encode stimulus probabilities along
with the posterior cingulate are all key regions of the default mode
network. Regions forming the default network have two charac-
teristics: (1) their spontaneous activity is correlated when people
are at rest, (2) they are deactivated during tasks requiring attention
to external stimuli [42]. The default mode network includes the
inferior parietal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, the medial
prefrontal cortex, the lateral temporal cortex, and the hippocam-
pus.
To test the involvement of the default network in the present
study, we explored the spontaneous correlations between ROIs
encoding probabilities and the whole brain during the resting
phase (threshold Tw7). Results showed a functional link between
each ROI and voxels in the other two. Each ROI was also
connected to activity in the posterior cingulate cortex (no table or
figure was reported for the separate analyses). Connections with
the posterior cingulate cortex were also observed when voxels of
the three ROIs were merged to define a single seed region (Fig. 6a,
GLM7, Table S17 in Text S1).
Baseline activity was compared between the decision-making
task (learning and decision phases) and the resting phase. Results
showed an increase of BOLD response in occipital, superior
parietal cortex, supplementary motor areas, and lateral prefrontal
cortex (red voxels, Fig. 6b, GLM1, S18 in Text S1). Decreased
activity was found bilaterally in angular gyrus, supramarginal
gyrus, and middle and superior temporal gyri. Decreased activity
was also observed in cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex (blue
voxels, Fig. 6b, Table S19 in Text S1, similar results were found
when comparing the resting phase to the learning phase only).
There was a substantial overlap between the task-negative network
and voxels encoding stimulus probabilities during the learning
period (Fig. 6c). The results indicated that regions reacting to likely
events belonged to the default network. On the other hand, there
was a substantial overlap between the task-positive network and
voxels reacting to rare stimuli (Fig. S3b in Text S1). For a
schematic of the main findings, see Fig. 7.
Discussion
In a complex and uncertain environment, probabilities are
essential for predicting future events. To make consistent choices,
Figure 5. Active decision phase. (a~:001, uncorr.) (a) BOLD
response in the bilateral insula to gambles combining high outcome
entropy and high expected value. Outcome uncertainty increased with
entropy. (b) BOLD response to choice entropy in the dorsal anterior
cingulate. Participants faced a more difficult choice when the
probabilities to buy and pass the gamble were close, that is when
choice entropy was high. (c) Striatal activation related to the magnitude
of the total payoff received at the end of the decision phase (net of the
total price). Whereas activation related to outcome and choice entropy
were observed before participants made a choice (anticipation), BOLD
response to the net payoff was observed afterwards (feedback).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.g005
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it is necessary for a decision maker to separate the chances of
objective events (‘‘it will snow’’) from the values that could
potentially be attached to those events (‘‘we can go skiing’’). With
such a strategy the decision maker can make inference in the
absence of immediate reinforcements and quickly adjust his
predictions when the reinforcing values of events change [43].
Here, we developed a paradigm in which the probability and value
of stimuli were statistically independent. This allowed us to identify
the regions in the brain encoding event probabilities and exclude a
confound with value.
Analysis of brain activity during the learning period revealed
both positive and negative correlations with stimulus probabilities.
BOLD response in angular gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex
increased for stimuli which had been observed many times in the
current trial. This relationship was significant in conditions with 2,
5, and 10 different stimuli. This shows that the brain can keep
track of the probabilities of multiple events. Comparison with the
resting state condition and connectivity analyses indicated that
these regions belonged to the default mode network and that their
baseline activity decreased during the task (task-negative network).
A negative correlation between stimulus probabilities was observed
in the occipital, superior parietal and lateral prefrontal cortex.
Here BOLD response increased for improbable stimuli. These
regions were more activated during the task (task-positive
network). Before a choice was made activity in striatum and
insula increased with gamble expected value. The effect of value in
insula was stronger when outcome entropy was high, that is when
the future was uncertain. Choice entropy which reflects decision
uncertainty was preferentially associated to a BOLD response in
dorsal anterior cingulate. After the decision, activity in the
striatum increased with the net payoff.
The principle of a separation between probability and value,
namely probabilistic sophistication [3,4], was supported by several
results. In the learning period, the effect of probabilities was
significant for both positive and negative events and the main
effect of probability did not interact with event value. No
significant effect of value was observed during the learning period.
These results suggest that when reinforcements are delayed, the
Figure 6. Default mode network. (a) Voxels showing connectivity
with angular gyri and medial prefrontal cortex ROIs during the resting
phase. (Tw7, uncorr.) (b) Voxels showing activation (red, task-positive
network) and deactivation (blue, task-negative network) during the
learning and decision phases (a~:001, uncorr.) (c) Overlap between
voxels encoding stimulus probabilities (Fig. 4a+b) and the task-negative
network (panel b, blue voxels).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.g006
Figure 7. Main findings. (a) During the resting phase, the spontaneous activity of the brain correlated between angular gyri, medial prefrontal
cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. This constitutes the first characteristic of the default mode network. (b) During the task (learning & decision
phases), baseline activity in these regions decreased. This is the second characteristic of the default network. At the same time, activation in the
occipital, superior parietal, lateral prefrontal cortex, and other regions involved in visual attention increased. (c) During the learning phase,
participants only saw the payoff in the center of the bin (stimulus). Nevertheless, the brain encoded the probability of currently observed stimulus
inferred from the hidden states (colors). BOLD response for frequent stimuli increased in angular gyri and medial prefrontal cortex. BOLD response for
rare stimuli increased in occipital areas, superior parietal cortex, middle frontal gyri, and hippocampus (Fig. S3a in Text S1). (d) Compared to the
resting phase, correlations between these regions increased during learning. (e) When participants had to decide whether to buy the gamble or not,
BOLD response in the insula increased with with gamble expected value, especially for when outcome entropy was high. At the same time, the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex signaled choice entropy (Fig. 5b). (f) After six choices, a feedback was displayed. The bilateral striatum encoded the net
payoff magnitude.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002895.g007
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brain focuses on event probabilities while abstracting from
rewards. It is only during the decision period that activation in
relation with value was observed.
These results are relevant for the debate on value-based and
model-based reinforcement learning [18]. In value-based rein-
forcement learning, the agent learns the expected value associated
to a situation or action by updating his forecast with a reward
prediction error. Through this process, the agent acquires
information about value but remains ignorant of probabilities. This
stands in sharp contrast with model-based reinforcement learning.
There, in order to forecast future rewards, the agent forms a
representation of how the world ‘‘behaves’’ and this can be done
by learning the probabilities of all events given the current
situation (i.e. ‘‘state transition probabilities’’, [44]). A neural
signature of probabilities but not value was observed during the
learning period. In addition, model comparison showed that
choices were better explained by a probability rather than a
reinforcement learning algorithm. Thus both behavioral and
biological data favored model-based over value-based reinforce-
ment learning in our task. By showing both positive and negative
BOLD response to event probabilities, the present study add to the
previous literature on model-based reinforcement learning [45].
The functionality of the regions encoding probabilities deserves
further discussion. Based on prior literature and our own results,
we would argue that activation correlating with rare stimuli in
occipital cortex reflects the visual exploration of the bin, while that
in parietal and middle frontal gyrus captures the attention
triggered by surprising events. Activation in hippocampus
enhances encoding of rare stimuli. In contrast, the positive
correlation between probabilities and activation in angular gyrus
and medial prefrontal cortex would reflect the reactivation and
reinforcement of past events in memory.
BOLD activity increased in the occipital cortex for rare stimuli
and this could be due to visual exploration. When a rare payoff
was sampled, its probability of occurrence increased. This might
incite participants to identify its associated color and re-evaluate its
relative importance by looking at all the colors and payoffs in the
periphery of the bin. Previous studies have shown increased
activation in the occipital cortex for visually incongruent stimuli
and this effect seems to generalize to rare events in our study [46].
Rare events were also related to activation in the superior parietal
cortex and middle frontal gyrus and this could be explained by
attentional processes. Indeed, these regions were more activated
during the task compared to the resting period (task-positive
network) and have been related to attention or the oddball effect
[17,47]. Activity in the hippocampus was observed when a new
stimulus was displayed, and the effect was stronger when the
stimulus was rare. Lesions to the middle temporal area and the
hippocampus can lead to amnesia and the inability to retain new
information [48]. The BOLD response in the hippocampus
suggests that rare events benefit from a better encoding when they
occur. This is consistent with behavioural studies showing that
surprising stimuli are better memorized [49].
Activity in the default network has been found to increase
during tasks of theory of mind, mind wandering, and memory
[50,51]. On the contrary, it has been found to decrease when
participants pay attention to external stimuli (task-negative
network). This was also the case in our task because participants
had to pay attention to the sampled payoffs. While controlling for
the effect of the task, activity increased in several regions of the
task-positive network when a rare stimuli was displayed. On the
contrary, a BOLD response in angular gyrus and medial
prefrontal cortex increased for frequent stimuli. A possible
explanation for this novel result is that frequent stimuli attract
less attention and hence allow for more resting-state introspection,
the role traditionally assigned to the default mode network. This
switch would be consistent with optimal use of the limited amount
of energy available in the brain [52]. However, the switch would
have to take place within the time frame of display of our stimuli (1
[s]). If this interpretation is indeed true, our findings would amount
to evidence for high-frequency switching between elemental states
of the brain, namely, attention and rest. An alternative explanation
is that activity in angular gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex
reflects a distinct process, namely, evidence accumulation. This
process can be modeled as we did, in terms of learning of
probabilities. A drift-diffusion approach [53] could be used
instead, though this approach is fundamentally the same.
A cognitive mechanism that could explain the positive
correlation between stimulus probability and brain activity is
memory [29]. Cognitive psychologists have developed models
centered on memory to explain how people judge the likelihood of
events [54]. In these models, each outcome is encoded as a trace in
memory. An event will be considered as probable if many traces
are retrieved from memory in response to a probe (the payoff in
our task). Neuroimaging studies have confirmed the involvement
of parietal and medial prefrontal cortex in memory: activity in
these areas predicts the successful recognition of items [31,55].
Furthermore, many studies have demonstrated involvement of the
default mode network in memory tasks [56,57]. As a consequence,
the positive brain response to stimulus probabilities in the angular
gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex might reflect the activation and
reinforcement of memory traces in reaction to a probe. This
hypothesis is compatible with an ‘‘attention to memory’’ model
developed in neuroscience [32,58]. In this model, activation in the
inferior parietal cortex reflects the attention captured by informa-
tion retrieved from memory. Still, because fMRI can only recover
correlation, other approaches like TMS are needed to determine
the causal role of angular gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex in the
acquisition and retrieval of event probabilities.
In decision neuroscience, the posterior cingulate and ventro-
medial prefrontal are often involved in the judgement of value
[59,60]. For instance the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex is more
activated when participants see the image of food they like [61,62].
A recent study has shown that the time spent watching an item
increased the likelihood to choose it and this type of behavior was
well formalized by drift-diffusion models [63]. Preferences depend
on the sensory characteristics of goods, but they are also shaped by
our past experience and memories [64]. The reactivation of
memory traces could partially explain why a key structure to
evaluate the value of goods, the ventro medial prefrontal cortex,
belongs to the default mode network and not to a task-positive or
saliency network like the striatum [65]. Accordingly, a recent study
has shown that affective value and associative processing shared a
common substrate in medial prefrontal cortex [66].
Our study sheds new light on decision making under
uncertainty when uncertainty is described as opposed to experi-
enced [1]. In a task where decisions were based on experience,
BOLD response to uncertain stimuli increased linearly with their
probabilities of occurrence. This was confirmed in behavior:
choices exhibited no bias is assessment of probabilities, in contrast
to decision making based on description of available gambles [67].
Our results therefore cast doubt on the generalizability of
probability weighting in prospect theory to decision making from
experience [68].
In addition to a better understanding of the neural foundation
of probability learning, the present study brings new knowledge
concerning the representation of various kind of uncertainties in
the brain [69]. Previous studies have linked uncertainty to activity
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in the insula [70,71], but also in the anterior cingulate cortex [72].
In the present study, we found that BOLD response in insula and
dorsal anterior cingulate were related to different forms of
uncertainty. Activity in the anterior cingulate correlated with
choice entropy which reflected uncertainty in making a choice.
The later interpretation matches previous studies reporting BOLD
response in dorsal anterior cingulate when a conflict existed
between several responses [73] (difficulty of choice).
Activity in the insula increased with the gamble expected value
and this effect was more pronounced when the outcome entropy
was high. Entropy corresponds to the notion of expected
uncertainty discussed by A. Yu and P. Dayan [74]. It is a function
of probabilities only and thus does not depend on the value
associated with the stimuli. An agent separating probability from
value would favor entropy over reward volatility to estimate risk.
When the outcome is a single and uncertain payoff, its standard
deviation and entropy covary. This might explain why previous
studies have found activation related to payoff standard-deviation
in the insula [71]. Another possibility is that the insula becomes
sensitive to entropy when participants learn state probabilities as in
the present study and rely less on summary statistics like payoff
mean and variance [75].
The general view that emerges from our study is that the brain
does not only react to rewarding or surprising events, but also to
likely events. When people observed uncertain stimuli, the average
activity in the default mode network decreased compared to a
resting condition. Nevertheless, the functional connectivity in this
network increased and stimulus probabilities were positively
correlated with BOLD response in angular gyrus and medial
prefrontal cortex. Thus activity in these two regions signalled the
accumulation of evidence (confirmatory signal). Brain response to
uncertain stimuli increased linearly in probability and there was no
evidence of probability weighting in choices. Further research is
needed to test if the brain response to likely events reflects an
activation of memory traces (internal world) or a lack of attention
to the environment (external world).
Methods
Participants
Twenty-five students from the Universite´ de Lausanne and the
Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne were enrolled in the
study. One participant was removed from the analysis because of
significant head movements. Another, because her decisions to
buy the gamble were random. The analyzed sample included 23
participants (10 women, 13 men; median age= 22, min= 19,
max= 30; all right handed). The study took place at the University
Hospital of Lausanne and was approved by its institutional review
board. At the end of the experiment, students received 1/10 of
their net play money in real currency, in addition to a 10 Frs (Swiss
francs) participation reward.
To explain the task, the investigator read the instructions aloud
and students played with one demonstration bin. They completed
the task in a 3 Tesla MRI scanner. During the functional image
acquisition, participants watched the display through goggles and
indicated their decision to buy or to pass the gamble by pressing
the left or right button of a response box. Participants learned
probabilities and made decisions on 9 different bins. After bin 3
and 6, a resting phase of 60 [s] was introduced.
Task
Payoffs were determined by the colors of balls drawn from a bin.
Bins contained balls of different colors, with same-colored balls
yielding the same payoff. The composition of the bin was hidden
therefore probabilities were unknown. The time line for one
example bin is shown in Fig. 2a. During the first sampling stage,
10 to 14 balls were drawn from the bin one after another and the
associated payoff was displayed for 1 [s] at the center of the screen.
Balls were drawn with replacement. Only stimuli representing the
payoffs were shown. Colors were hidden states. These states could
be inferred from the colored balls displayed in the periphery of the
bin.
This learning phase was followed by a decision phase. The
participant had to decide whether to buy the gamble or not for a
certain price. After each choice, an additional ball was drawn. If
the participant bought the gamble, he earned the payoff written on
the ball minus the price. Otherwise, the payoff was 0 and the play
money remained unchanged. Four choices were made without
knowing the outcome in advance (active condition) and two
choices were made while knowing the outcome in advance (control
condition). For each of the six choices, a different price was posted.
Prices were drawn from a uniform distribution between the
minimum and maximum payoffs. After each decision, a message
indicating that the gamble was bought or passed was shown (but
the payoff was not shown to limit learning in the decision period).
The total net payoff of the current decision period was displayed
after the six choices.
The learning and decision phases were repeated with the same
bin after changing the color-payoff association. That is, color
probabilities remained unchanged (same composition of the bin),
but each color was associated with a new payoff. It was thus
adaptive to learn probabilities based on the color of the past
drawings. In Fig. 2, the color-payoff association in panel a is
reproduced in the top insert of panel b. For instance, red was
associated with 57 in the sampling stage and with 67 in the
resampling stage. Bins contained balls of 2, 5, or 10 different
colors. The probabilities used to generate the drawings are
represented by the histograms in Fig. 2b. Because balls were
drawn with replacement, these probabilities remained constant
during the sampling and resampling stages.
Nine different bins were presented in the task. Importantly, colors
were randomly assigned to probabilities at the beginning of each
new bin. Payoffs were randomly assigned to colors at the beginning
of each sampling stage. As a consequence, payoff probabilities are
orthogonal to payoff magnitudes and expected payoff. Uncertainty
at decision time increased with both the number of possible payoffs
and the payoff standard-deviation. To disentangle their effects, these
two factors were manipulated independently (Fig. S5). See section
Task in Text S1 for more details.
Choice modeling
Learning phase. During the learning phase, probabilities
were updated following Bayes’ rule. In the mathematical
formulation of the models, m indexes the states s in the bin,
m~1,2   M, with M the number of states (2, 5 or 10 colors). So
s refers to a color (e.g., blue). The probability of state m at drawing
t is a random variable hmt, with t~1,2,   T1,T1z1,   T2 (with
1 and T1 referring to the first and last drawing the initial sampling
stage and T1z1 and T2 to the first and last drawing in the
resampling stage). The vector of probabilities~ht follows a Dirichlet
distribution D(~at). The PDF of ~ht is given by:
pdf(~ht)~
C(At)
C(a1t)   C(aMt) h
a1t{1
1t    h
aMt{1
Mt ,
with At~a1t   zaMt. Let p(sm) denote the true probability of
state m. The point estimation p^ of this true probability is given by:
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p^(smDIt)~E(~ht)~
~at
At
:
with It the information available at time t.
We use kmt to indicate the number of times state m was
observed at drawing t. Before any drawing, ~kt~~0. To specify the
Dirichlet distribution at any time, we set ~at~~apriorz~kt. Without
any knowledge of the composition of the bin, it is rational to
assume that all colors have the same chance of occurrence when a
new bin is encountered. Thus we chose ~aprior~~1. As a result and
before any sample had been observed, p^(sm)~1=M for all state m.
E.g., for a bin with 5 colors, all probabilities are expected to equal
1=5. In model M4b (no probability learning), ~kt~~0 for all t, thus
probabilities are not updated and remain equal to the priors. In
model M4a (probabilities inferred from observations),~kt is set to~0
at the beginning of the sampling and resampling stages but it
records the occurrence of states. This is equivalent to learning the
probabilities without reference to colors. In model M4 (probabil-
ities inferred from hidden states), ~kt is set to~0 at the beginning of
the initial sampling stage and it records the occurrence of states. It
is not reset to ~0 at the beginning of the resampling stage.
Decision phase. We first need to define a function f that
associate a payoff xm to each state sm. So this function links each
color to a payoff. In the task, we only show the payoff in the center
of the bin (stimulus), so the underlying state is inferred with the
inverse function sm~f
{1(xm). In model M2, the identity function
was used to transform payoffs (net of the posted price z). In models
M4, M4a, M4b, and M5, a non-differentiable value function was
used instead:
v(xm,z)~
(xm{z)
a if (xm{z)§0,
{lDxm{zDa otherwise,

ð1Þ
with a representing the diminishing sensitivity parameter and l
representing the loss aversion parameter.
In all models the identity function was used for probabilities,
expect for model M5 which had a probability weighting function:
w(p)~
pc
(pcz(1{p)c)
1
c
ð2Þ
where c controls the S shape.
Subjective values and probabilities were multiplied and then
summed over states to compute the expected value of the gamble:
V^t~
XM
m
w(p^(f{1(xm)DIt))v(xm,z), ð3Þ
To convert estimated values into choices, we used the softmax
model. There, the probability that the gamble is bought is given
by:
logit(P(‘buy
;
))~b0zb1(V^t),
where V^t denotes the estimated value of the gamble at the end of
the learning phase (i.e., at t~T1 for the sampling stage, and t~T2
for the resampling stage). Nelder-Mead optimization was used to
find the maximum likelihood (MLL) of this logistic regression.
Search was repeated 5 times with different starting values. The
best fit was retained (restarts yielded to very close results).
Outcome entropy at the end of the learning phase was
computed with:
H^t~{
XM
m
p^(f{1(xm)DIt) log (f{1(xm)DIt), ð4Þ
with p^(:) log p^(:)~0 if p^(:)~0. To compute the entropy of choices,
state probabilities were replaced by choice probabilities derived
from the softmax function.
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